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1 Introduction
The decades long empirical research on the relationship between income inequal-
ity and economic development has produced controversial results, with the di-
rection and the statistical significance of the effect of income inequality on eco-
nomic growth changing between studies (Banerjee & Duflo 2003, Barro 2000,
Chen 2003, Forbes 2000, Li & Zou 1998, Lin et al. 2006). Theories have also
generally been divided on the effect of income inequality on growth. The classi-
cal approach argues that saving rates are an increasing function of wealth. In this
case, inequality will increase incomes of the rich whose marginal propensity to
save is the highest. Thus, income inequality will lead to faster capital accumula-
tion (Kaldor 1957, Kuznets 1955, Smith 1776). The political economy approach
emphasizes the destabilizing effect that inequality may have on the society (Ben-
habib & Rustichini 1996). According to this view, equality will increase stability
in the society and simulate investments and economic growth. The credit market
imperfection approach suggests that equality of incomes diminishes the effect of
credit-constraints on human capital accumulation in developed economies (Galor
& Zeira 1993). Because credit-constraints become less binding in an developed
economy where incomes are distributed evenly, equality of incomes will fasten
the accumulation of human capital and thus accelerate economic growth.
Despite of several theories describing the relationship between inequality and
growth, the dependence between the variables over time remains a open empiri-
cal question. Although we have observations on GDP from several consecutive
years, values of commonly used Gini indexes (e.g. the Deininger and Squire’s
(1996) Gini index) have not been consistently measured over time, which has
made it virtually impossible to assess the possible time dependence between the
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two variables. Some studies have tried to bypass this problem by regressing the
values of averaged growth rates of 20 years, or more, on the values of Gini index
and other explanatory variables in the first year included in the averaging (Chen
2002, Forbes 2000). The problem with this method is that these multidecade aver-
ages lose a lot of information and there is a risk of spurious parameter estimates.
The observed controversy in the relation between inequality and growth has also
led some to estimate the relation using non-parametric or semi-parametric meth-
ods (Banerjee & Duflo 2003, Frazer 2006, Lin et al. 2006). The advantages of
non-parametric methods are the fact that they can be used to estimate the relation
between variables in both short- and long-run and robustness. The drawback of
these methods is low statistical power compared to parametric methods, especially
in finite samples. Recently, Galbraith and Kum (2006) have gathered a Gini index
data set that has continuous observations from several countries, which enables
the use of panel data time series methods.
From time series analysis we know that, if variables are integrated processes,
we can learn about their long-run dependence by testing whether the variables are
cointegrated. If variables are found to be cointegrated, there exists a stationary dis-
tribution between them, and we can estimate this steady-state relationship using
standard estimation methods. Unfortunately, these rules do not apply to panel data
per se. The inference and estimation in panel cointegrated data differs from that
in regular time series, because the asymptotic properties of the estimators in panel
cointegrated regression models are different from those of time series cointegrated
regression models (Baltagi 2008, Phillips & Moon 1999). The time series regres-
sion may, for example, be spurious, while the panel regression utilising all cross
sections is not (Phillips & Moon 1999). OLS estimator is also not asymptotically
unbiased in cointegrated panel data (Kao & Chiang 2000).
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This study uses panel cointegration methods and improved data on income in-
equality to assess the possible steady-state relationship between income inequality
and economic development. According to panel unit root tests, both the logarith-
mic EHII2.1 Gini index and the logarithmic GDP series seem to follow an I(1)
process in countries in question.1 They are also found to be cointegrated of order
one using Pedroni’s (2004) panel cointegration test, which implies that there is
long-run equilibrium relation between them. The cointegrating coefficient of Gini
index is estimated with panel dynamic OLS and panel dynamic SUR estimators
and it is found to be negative.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general theories
describing the causal relationship from income inequality to economic growth.
Section 3 presents the data and section 4 report the results of panel unit root and
cointegration tests. Estimation details and results are given in section 5 and section
6 concludes.
2 The theoretical relationships between inequality
and growth
Benabou (2005) has suggested that endogeneity of income inequality in growth
regressions is the primary reason for the observed controversy in empirical stud-
ies. It is quite intuitive that income of a country and the distribution of income
within a country are jointly determined. This is also a prominent feature in the
theories describing the relationship between inequality and development. Three
main theoretical linkages between inequality and growth are presented here: the
classical income approach, the combined credit-market imperfections approach,
1EHII=Estimated Household Income Inequality Data Set by University of Texas Inequality
Project.
3
and the political economy approach.
2.1 The income approach
In classical economic theory, inequality of income was assumed to influence eco-
nomic growth rates through savings and consumption. According to Adam Smith
(1776), an increased division of labor raises productivity, but savings govern cap-
ital accumulation, which enables production growth. When the saving function is
linear, e.g. si = myi +b, where yi is output per capita, m is the marginal propensity
to save, and b is the per capita savings at zero income, aggregate saving behavior
in an economy is not affected by the distribution of income (Stiglitz 1969). How-
ever, if the saving function is nonlinear, aggregate savings become dependent on
the distribution of income.
When the saving function is linear or concave, distribution of income and
wealth converge toward equality (Stiglitz 1969). If the saving function is convex,
i.e. the marginal propensity to save increases with income,2 uneqalitarian station-
ary distributions, or steady-state equilibriums, are Pareto superior to egalitarian
stationary distributions (appendix A). This is because, in the case of a convex
saving function, more unequal distribution of income results in higher capital in-
tensity through greater aggregate savings. In these unegalitarian steady-state equi-
libria, income and consumption for all individuals are greater than in egalitarian
steady-state equilibria. In addition, in a steady-state equilibrium, where income
are distributed unevenly, the wealth of a nation is greater than in the steady-state
equilibriuim, where incomes are distributed evenly. However, these steady-state
equilibria exist only when all individuals have positive wealth. Thus, result may
not apply, for example, to developing countries.
2The hypothesis of convex savings function is supported by empirical findings, see e.g. Dynan
et al. (2004).
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As mentioned above, there is also a consumption "side" included in the clas-
sical income approach. Adam Smith (1776) argued that production growth is not
possible without sufficient demand. According to Smith, sufficient demand in the
economy would be achieved, when every man were able to "provide for himself
and his family". This line of reasoning was developed further by Keynes (1936).
According to Keynes, demand is the basis for investments and, because inequality
lowers aggregate consumption, inequality of income will lead to slower economic
growth. Although this demand, or Keynesian, side approach has been neglected
for some time, it has staged a massive comeback in the wake of the current eco-
nomic crisis. The current economic slowdown is caused by a combination of a
massive drop in the global demand and a severe credit crunch, which, naturally,
are feeding each other (Krugman 2008). Keynes’s (1936) argument that inequal-
ity decreases consumption is valid, if the saving function is convex. In this case,
aggregate demand diminishes when income become more unequally distributed.
2.2 The credit-market imperfections and combined approach
The income approach emphasizes the effect of income inequality on savings and
on physical capital accumulation. Credit market imperfections approach considers
the effect of income inequality on the accumulation of human capital.
Credit market imperfections affect growth rates by limiting the division of la-
bor (Fishman & Simhon 2002). When credit-market imperfections are present,
people cannot borrow against future income. This will restrict households’ access
to education. In this case, the initial level of capital and income inequality will
determine the level of specialization. When the intensity of capital in the econ-
omy is small, unequal income distribution will encourage capital owners to invest
in specialization. This will lead to higher division of labour and raise the econ-
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omy to a higher steady-state growth path. However, when the level of capital in
the economy is large, more equal distribution of income will lead to wide based
demand for goods and to higher level of education and division of labour. In this
case, equal income distribution will lead to faster steady-state growth.
Galor and Moav (2004) have combined the credit market and income ap-
proaches. In their model, the engine of economic growth changes from physical
capital to physical and human capital in the process of economic development.
The process of economic development is divided into two regimes, which have
their own steady-state growth paths.
Economies in the first regime are underdeveloped, aggregate physical capital
is small, and the rate of return to human capital is lower than the rate of return
to physical capital (Galor & Moav 2004). There are two types of individuals in
the economy: those who own the physical capital (the rich) and those who do not
(the poor). The poor consume their entire income (wages) and are not engaged
in saving and on capital accumulation. Thus, there is a temporary steady-state
equilibrium where the poor are in poverty trap and the rich get richer. Inequal-
ity increases aggregate savings by increasing the income of the rich and greater
aggregate savings fuel physical capital accumulation.3
In the second regime, physical capital accumulation by the rich has increased
the rate of return to human capital so high that it induces human capital accumula-
tion (Galor & Moav 2004). In this regime, both human and physical capital are en-
gines for economic development. Since individuals’ investment in human capital
is subjected to diminishing marginal returns, the return to human capital invest-
ments is maximized when investment in human capital is widely spread among
3In modern less developed economies, it is possible that also human capital drives growth, if
the capital and skill-biased technology is imported. In this case, the effect of inequality on growth
would be mixed or negative (Galor & Moav 2004).
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the population. Because access to credit is constrained, human capital investment
is maximized when income in the economy are distributed evenly. However, in
a certain phase of economic development income of every individual becomes so
high that credit constraints become less binding. In this locally stable steady-state
equilibrium, the effect of inequality on growth becomes less significant.
2.3 The political economy approach
Political economy models assume that preferences of individuals are aggregated
through political process. Therefore, redistribution of incomes and economic
growth are driven by the political process. Political process can be driven by a
median voter or by organized social groups.
In the model by Perotti (1993), credit-markets are imperfect and median voter
defines the redistribution of incomes through taxation and the level of subsidies
to all income classes. In the first period, individual can invest in education, which
increases the income of an individual in the second period and has a positive
externality on the second period productivity of other individuals. Individuals
can also choose not to invest in education in the first period. In the first period,
individuals vote over the level of income taxes, and the revenues of these taxes
are redistributed as per capita subsidy, which is constant over all individuals. The
utility of individual i depends on the tax rate in period 1 and on the amount of other
individuals that have invested in education in period 1. The tax rate determines
the possibility of agent i to invest in education in period 1. If the tax rate is too
high, individual i cannot invest in education because credit-markets are imperfect.
However, higher tax rate and higher per capita subsidies makes it possible for
many other individuals to invest in education, which increases the pre-tax income
of individual i in the second period.
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Now the steady-state equilibrium reached by the economy depends on the ini-
tial distribution of income (Perotti 1993). If the aggregate capital in the economy
is very small, redistribution of income through taxes and subsidies will result in
a poverty trap where no one is able to acquire education. In this case, more un-
equal distribution of income will help the economy because in that case at least
some individuals can acquire education and increase the level of human capital in
the economy. As economy becomes more developed, very unequal income dis-
tribution may diminish growth because the accumulation of more human capital
would require that middle-income and poor individuals acquire education, as the
rich have already educated themselves. In an rich economy, only the poor may
increase the level of human capital in the economy and higher steady-state growth
path requires that income are distributed evenly.
3 Time series analysis of panel data
The theoretical models presented above predict steady-state equilibrium relations,
or stationary distributions, that may exist between income inequality and the evo-
lution of output. The estimation of these theoretical stationary distributions re-
quires that we know the time series features of the variables in the model. First,
the stationarity of the data must be tested. If variables are found to be integrated
processes of order 1, the existence of equilibrium relations can be tested by test-
ing for cointegration. If cointegrating relations are found, the cointegrating vector
can be estimated using estimators developed for panel cointegrated data. Many
models also assume that income distribution and economic development are de-
termined endogenously, which has to be taken into account in the estimation.
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3.1 Data
Data for this study consist at four variables: real GDP per capita, EHII2.1 Gini
index, portion of investments on GDP, and average years of schooling. Gross
domestic product is stated in real terms with the base year of 1996. Investments
are gross investments as a portion of GDP. The data on GDP and investments are
from Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2006). The EHII2.1 Gini index is from the
University of Texas Inequality Project (Galbraith & Kum 2006) and average years
of shooling is from Barro and Lee’s (2000) dataset.
Many of the previous studies made on the relationship between income in-
equality and economic growth have used the Deininger and Squire’s (1996) Gini
index as a measure on income distribution.4 The main reason why so many re-
searchers have relied on the Deininger and Squire’s Gini index has been its al-
leged "high quality". However, as pointed out by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001,
p. 780), Deininger and Squire’s dataset includes so many different datasets that in
many cases it would be "highly misleading to regard Deininger and Squire’s "high
quality" estimates as a continuos series". The different country-related datasets in
Deininger and Squire’s "high quality" dataset may also not be comparable with
each other. These are serious problems for estimation, because the statiscal in-
ference requires that observations are from the same parent population. If the
observations are not comparable, there is no one coherent parent population and
the parameter estimates may be spurious.
Many scholars studying income inequality have already switched to Gini in-
dex provided by UNU-Wider.5 Although UNU-Wider Gini index seems more
consistent and accurate than Deininger and Squire’s Gini index, they share one
4These include Barro (2000), Banerjee and Duflo (2003), Forbes (2000), and Chen (2003).
5World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University
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deficiency. Both Gini indexes are unevenly distributed through time, which re-
stricts their use in time series analysis. However, Galbraith and Kum (2006) have
gathered a EHII2.1 Gini index, which has a consistent, long time series for several
countries.
According to Galbraith and Kum (2006), EHII2.1 Gini index has three clear
advantages over the Deininger and Squire’s Gini index. It has more than 3000
estimates, while Deininger and Squire have only about 700 "high quality" es-
timates. EHII2.1 gets its accuracy from the Industrial data published annually
by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). This way
changes over time and differences across countries in pay dispersion are reflected
in income inequality. All estimates are also adjusted to household gross income,
which makes them congruent. Values of the EHII2.1 also correspond to the es-
timates of income distributions of other research institutes, such as the OECD,
better than those of Deininger and Squire’s Gini index (Föster & Pearson 2002,
Galbraith & Kum 2004).
3.2 Panel unit root tests
There are 60 countries in the EHII2.1 data set where the time series of Gini index
is consistent and at least 20 years long. After individual unit root tests, 7 countries
were discarded from the set because their series of Gini index or GDP did not
seem to follow a I(1) process according to the ADF-test.6 Descriptive statistics of
the remaining 53 countries are presented in table 1 and a list of the 53 countries is
presented in appendix B.
6This is a precautionary method. Karlsson and Löthgren (2000) have studied how few station-
ary series in the panel can alter the results of panel unit root tests. They found that when the time
dimension of a dataset is large (50 or over), small fraction of stationary series in the dataset results
to high power and vice versa. Therefore, there is a risk that panels with large T would erroneously
be modeled as stationary and panels with small T as non-stationary.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
variable mean std. deviation min. max.
GDP 6624.25 6740.03 145.24 43138.33
GDP growth (%) 2.533 4.860 -26.774 56.074
Gini index 39.571 6.631 23.074 58.975
investments (%) 18.112 8.525 0.191 52.531
average schooling (%) 4.602 2.773 0.390 10.090
Most of the time series analysis methods for panel data assume that there is
no cross-unit correlation present in the panel. When dealing with economic vari-
ables, this restriction is quite uncomfortable, because for example business cycles
do transfer to neighboring countries quite easily in modern open economies. To
account for the obvious cross-sectional correlation present in the data, the results
of Pesaran’s (2007) panel unit root test allowing for cross-sectional dependence
are also reported.
The traditional panel unit root tests used in this study are based on the follow-
ing regression:
4yit = ρiyi,t−1 + δi + ηit + θt + it, (1)
where δi are the individual constants, ηit are the individual time trends, and θt is
the common time effect. All tests rely on the assumption that E[it js] = 0 ∀ t, s
and i , j, which is required for the calculation of common time effects. The null
hypothesis in all tests is H0 : ρi = 0 ∀ i, but the tests have different assumptions
about the heterogeneity of ρ and on the alternative hypothesis.7 The inclusion of
individual constants and time trends is also optional.
Pesaran’s (2007) test is based on a regression
4yit = ρyi,t−1 + ηit + αi + δiθt + it, (2)
7For example, Im et al. (2003) test’s alternative hypothesis is that some but not all of the
individual series may have unit roots vs. Levin et al. (2002) test which assumes homogeneity
between cross-sections.
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where αis are the individual constants, ηit are the individual time trends, θt is the
common time effect, whose coefficients, δi, are assumed to be non-stochastic and
they measure the impact of the common time effect on series i, it ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2)
over t, and it is independent of  js and θs for all i , j and s, t. Cross-sectional
dependence is allowed through the common time effects which are proxied by the
cross-section mean of yit (y¯t = N−1Σnj=1y jt) and its lagged values, y¯t−1, y¯t−2, etc.
The null hypothesis is that H0 : ρi = 0 ∀ i and alternative hypothesis allows for
some of the tested series to be nonstationary.
Two different types of panel unit root tests are used. Levin, Lin and Chu’s
(2002) (LLC) test assume a common unit root process, i.e. ρi = ρ ∀ i. Im,
Pesaran, and Shin’s (2003) test (IPS), Fisher type ADF and PP tests, presented by
Maddala and Wu (1999), and Pesaran’s (2007) test allow for a individual unit root
processes.
Summary of the results of the five panel unit root tests are presented in table
2.8 Individual trends and constants are included in the tests for the GDP and Gini
index. For the GDP it is natural to allow for both individual time trends and con-
stants, because the time series of the GDP usually follows a clear upward trend.
The time series of Gini index also seems to be trending in many countries,9 and
so it is also allowed to have individual time trends. GDP growth and investments
seem not to exhibit a trend, and so only individual constants are included in their
tests.10 All other tests use the unbalanced panel data of 53 countries,11 except
8All the test were performed with Eviews 6, except Pesaran’s (2007) test which was done with
Stata. Lag lengths have been determined using Schwarts information criterion, spectral estima-
tion has been conducted with Bartlett kernel and bandwidth has been selected using Newey-West
method.
9The time series were inspected visually.
10If individual trends are included, the results change only marginally and both series are still
stationary according to all five tests.
11Panel unit root test were also conducted using the whole dataset of 60 countries. Results were
similar to those presented in table 2.
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Pesaran’s (2007) test where a balanced panel of 38 countries with 25 yearly ob-
servations is used.12
Table 2: Panel unit root tests
variable LLC IPS ADF PP Pesaran*
log(GDP) 9.068 15.092 15.855 16.072 0.709
(1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.761)
GDP growth -45.913 -25.415 572.04 599.36 -12.089
(<.0001) (<0.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
log(Gini index) 0.549 2.702 77.387 70.521 -0.790
(0.7085) (0.9966) (0.9834) (0.9968) (0.215)
log(investments) -6.071 -7.558 244.13 212.80 -4.529
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
The p-values of the test statistics are presented in parentheses. All tests include individual effects
and trends except the test for GDP growth and investments which include only individual effects.
Lag lengths were determined using Schwarts information criterion. All other tests use unbalanced
panel of 53 countries except Pesaran’s test, where the panel is balanced including 38 countries and
25 yearly observations.
According to all five tests, the logarithmic GDP and Gini index seem to fol-
low a I(1) process, and the series of GDP growth and investments seem to be
stationary.13 However, as mentioned above, it is likely that at least some of the
tested series are cross-sectionally correlated or cointegrated. This would violate
the assumption of uncorrelated residuals among cross-sections, i.e. E[it js] , 0
∀ t, s and i , j. Banerjee et al. (2005) have studied the effect of the violation of
the assumption of no cross-unit cointegration on rejection frequencies of the null
hypothesis. Their results show that in the presence of cross-unit cointegration,
the ADF, PP, and IPS tests grossly overreject the null hypothesis of unit root with
small time (T ) and relatively large cross-sectional (n) dimensions of data. Here,
all these tests accept the null hypothesis in the series of the Gini index and GDP.
12Pesaran’s (2007) test requires that the panel is balanced.
13Results were the same when original data of 60 countries are used.
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As Pesaran’s (2007) test also accepts the null hypothesis for the Gini index and
GDP, they seem very likely to be unit root processes.14 As Pesaran’s test finds the
GDP per capita growth and investments to be stationary, they can be assumed to
be stationary.
3.3 Panel cointegration test
The possible cointegration between Gini index and GDP is tested with Pedroni’s
(2004) panel cointegration test which consist of 11 different test statistics.15 Pe-
droni´s panel cointegration test is based on the model:
yit = αi + δit + βiXit + it, (3)
where αi:s and δi:s allow for member specific fixed effects and deterministic
trends, Xit is a m-dimensional column vector of explanatory variables for each
member i, and βi is an m-dimensional row vector for each member i. The vari-
ables yit and Xit are assumed to be integrated of order one. Thus, under the null
of no cointegration, the residual eit will also be I(1). Pedroni’s test is based on
running the auxiliary regression on every cross-section
it = ρiit + uit, (4)
where E[uitu js] = 0 ∀s, t, i , j. There are two null hypotheses: ρi = ρ < 1 ∀ i
(within- dimension test) and ρi < 1 ∀ i (between-dimension test).
The model for testing for cointegration between the Gini index and GDP is:
log(GDPit) = αi + δit + γilog(Giniit) + βilog(investments) + it, (5)
14First differenced series are stationary according to all panel unit root tests. The GDP and Gini
index thus seem to be I(1).
15There are 7 different test statistics, but Eviews 6 gives also the results of weighted test statistics
on the first four tests. Tests statistics include the panel versions of PP and ADF tests, a form of
the average of the Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) test statistics (ρ), and panel variance ratio statistics
(v).
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where the changes in GDP are explained by the changes in the Gini index and on
the level of investments, and (1,−γi) is the individual cointegration vector between
Gini index and GDP. Results of Pedroni’s panel cointegration tests on equation (5)
are presented in table 3.16
Table 3: Pedroni’s panel cointegration test statistics for log(GDP) and log(Gini
index)
Within-dimension
statistic prob. weight. statistic prob.
panel v-statistic 49.309 <.0001 44.793 <.0001
panel ρ-statistic 7.152 <.0001 7.329 <.0001
panel PP-statistic 2.888 0.0062 3.494 0.0009
panel ADF-statistic 2.489 0.0180 3.039 0.0039
Between-dimension
statistic prob.
group ρ-statistic 9.417 <.0001
group PP-statistic 4.555 <.0001
group ADF-statistic 2.313 0.0275
countries 53
observations 1961
Within-dimension tests presuppose common AR coefficients among cross sections. Between-
dimension presupposes individual AR coefficients. Lag length were determined with Schwarz
information criterion. Spectral estimation was done with Bartlett method and bandwidth was se-
lected with Newey-West method.
According to all of the 11 test statistics presented in table 3, the series of Gini
and GDP are cointegrated at the 5% level. The test is also conducted using only
the Gini index as an explanatory variable for GDP. In this case, 9 of the 11 test
statistics find the GDP and Gini index to be cointegrated. If the test is conducted
using only investments as an explanatory variable, all of the 11 test statistics find
the investments and GDP to be cointegrated. This indicates that there might be
cross-sectional cointegration relations in the panel. Cross-unit cointegration can
16The test was performed with Eviews 6.
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bias the results of panel unit root tests towards type I error, i.e. that hypothesis
of unit root is rejected far too often (Banerjee et al. 2005, Breitung & Pesaran
2005). Even if this would no be the case, the results of Pedroni’s (2004) test leave
only little room for a doubt. If investments would be a stationary process, there
could not be a linear combination between GDP and investments that would be
stationary.17 Thus, investments is assumed to be a I(1) process that is cointegrated
with GDP.
As with panel unit root tests, the presence of cross-sectional cointegration may
have affected the results. However, according to Banerjee et. al. (2004), panel v
and panel ρ -statistics keep their nominal size reasonably well in the presence of
cross-sectional cointegration even with small T and relatively large n dimensions
of data. Because all these test statistics reject the hypothesis of no cointegration,
GDP and Gini index and GDP and investments seem very likely to be cointe-
grated.18
4 Estimation
To compare the results of different estimation methods, two different estimation
frameworks are used. First, in section 4.1 averaged GDP per capita growth rates
are regressed on explanatory variables in cross-sectional setting. Second, in sec-
tion 4.2 GDP per capita levels are regressed on explanatory variables in panel
setting to find out the cointegrating coefficient of Gini index.
17Assuming that GDP per capita is a I(1) process.
18The cointegration between log (GDP) and log(Gini index) and log(GDP) and log(investments)
were also tested with Johansen’s combined Fisher panel cointegration test developed by Maddala
and Wu (1999). According to it, both GDP and Gini index and GDP and investments are cointe-
grated of order one. Detailed results are available upon request.
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4.1 Estimation using average growth rates
In growth regressions, the growth rate has usually been averaged over 5 years or
more to eliminate the possible business cycles. Five year business cycle "smooth-
ing" is usually appropriate, because it is short enough to capture the possible struc-
tural changes appearing in the relation. Five year intervals mean that the estimated
coefficients represent short or medium term effects. The estimation of long run
growth elasticities would require averages of 20 years or more.
Here, average growth rates of 30 years are used. The risks related to the use
of multidecade averages in estimation are clear. When the dependent variable is
averaged over a long period of time, it loses a lot of information and the risk for
spurious regressions is high, because there is no control over the possible changes
in the relation between dependent and explanatory variable(s). It is also problem-
atic for statistical inference to assume that the changes in some variable in one
year would affect some other variable for the next 20 years or more.
The model to be estimated is a Barro-type extended version of the neoclassical
growth model:
growth30yi,T/t0 = α + β1log(GDPi,t0) + β2log(investmenti,t0)
+β3log(Ginii,t0) + β4log(averageschoolingi,t0) + i,
(6)
where the 30 year average GDP per capita growth rates are regressed against the
values of explanatory variables at the beginning of the averaging. All the countries
whose 30 year average growth rate was negative, are discarded from the estima-
tion. If a country has experienced a deceleration in the GDP in the 30 year period,
it is highly likely that this has resulted from some structural factors rather than
changes in the explanatory variables included in equation (6). Results of estima-
tion of equation (6) are presented in table 4.
According to the results, none of the parameter estimates is statistically sig-
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Table 4: Regression results using average growth rates between 1970-1999
Dependent var.: Growth 30y Growth 30y Growth 30y
Constant 6.1963** 9.227 9.1026
(2.2600) (6.7071) (7.1256)
log(GDP)70 -0.3209 -0.5514 -0.7331
(0.3526) (0.5656) (0.5992)
log(investments)70 0.0455 0.0480 0.0561
(0.0291) (0.0298) (0.0324)
log(Gini)70 - -0.0345 -0.0125
(0.0777) (0.1058)
log(averageschooling)70 - - 0.0862
(0.2743)
estimator OLS OLS OLS
countries 46 46 46
The estimated period is 1970-1999. Explanatory variables are measured in 1970. Standard errors
are presented in parentheses. All estimations are done using White heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors and covariances.
nificant at the 5% level. Thus, the results of table 4 show that estimation using
multi-decade growth averages leads to high standard errors of parameter estima-
tors, which in turn leads to economically uncongenial results (e.g. investments
have no statistically significant effect on GDP growth).
However, there is also an obvious econometric problem present in standard
growth regression models, when they are applied to long-run growth relationships.
To see this, consider a standard growth regression in panel setting:
4GDPit = ρ(GDPi,t−1) + β(Ginii,t−1) + it. (7)
Now, if GDP and Gini index are I(1) processes, ρ → 0, and β → 0, because
integrated processes cannot provide any relevant information on stationary pro-
cess. Thus, standard growth regressions would produce nonsense estimates on the
long-run effect on inequality to growth.19
19The same result, naturally, applies to time series estimation.
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4.2 Estimation of the cointegrating coefficient of Gini index
4.2.1 Estimation and inference in cointegrated panels
Conventional limit theorems assume one index (n or T ) to pass to infinity. The
limit theory for panels with large cross-sectional (n) and time (T ) dimensions
needs to allow both indexes to pass to infinity. This has some profound effects for
estimators. For example the OLS estimator is not asymptotically unbiased, and
the standard GMM estimator is inconsistent for panel cointegrated data (Kao &
Chiang 2000).
Several estimators for cointegrated panel data have been proposed. Proba-
bly the most commonly used estimators have been the fully-modified OLS (FM-
OLS) proposed by Phillips and Moon (1999) and Pedroni (2000), and the dy-
namic OLS (DOLS) proposed by Kao and Chiang (2000). The major problem
for estimators in cointegrated panel data has been the modeling of simultaneous
cross-sectional and time series dependence (Phillips & Moon 1999). Mark and Sul
(2003) have developed a version of DOLS estimator that allows for simultaneous
cross-sectional and time series dependence.
Mark and Sul (2003) consider a DOLS estimator with fixed effects, fixed ef-
fects and heterogenous trends, and with fixed effects, heterogenous trends, and
common time effects. The last model accounts for cross-sectional dependence by
introducing a common time effect. Mark and Sul’s model assumes that observa-
tions on each individual i obey the following triangular representation
yit = αi + λit + θt + γ′xit + uit, (8)
where (1,−γ′) is a cointegrating vector between yit and xit, which is identical
across individuals, αi is a individual-specific effect, λit is a individual-specific
linear trend, θt is a common time-specific factor, and uit is a idionsyncratic error
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that is independent across i, but possibly dependent across t. Model (8) allows for
a limited form of cross-sectional correlation, where the equilibrium error for each
individual is driven in part by θt.
Panel DOLS eliminates the possible endogeneity between explanatory vari-
ables and the dependent variable by assuming that uit is correlated at most with
pi leads and lags of 4xit (Mark & Sul 2003). The possible endogeneity can be
controlled by projecting uit onto these pi leads and lags:
uit =
pi∑
s=−pi
δ′i,s4xi,t−s + uit∗ = δ′izit + u∗it (9)
The projection error u∗it is orthogonal to all leads and lags of 4xit and the estimated
equation becomes
yit = αi + λit + θt + γ′xit + δ′izit + u
∗
it, (10)
where δ′izit is a vector of projection dimensions. The consistent estimation of (10)
is based on sequential limits, i.e. as T → ∞ then n → ∞. Equation (10) can be
feasible estimated in panels with small to moderate n.
Wagner and Hlouskova (2007) have compared the performance of different
types of estimators for panel cointegrated data. They found that Mark and Sul’s
(2003) DOLS system estimator (panel DOLS) performs best in the case of cross-
unit correlation or cointegration compared to several other estimators developed
for panel cointegrated data.20
It is, of course, possible that the common time-effect included in panel DOLS
estimation cannot capture all the cross-sectional correlation present in the data.
This is a problem especially if there remains correlation between equilibrium er-
ror, uit, and leads and lags of other cross-sections 4x jt, j , i. In this case the
20The tested estimators included FM-OLS presented by Phillips and Moon (1999), DOLS pre-
sented by Kao and Chiang (2000) and Mark and Sul (2003), one-step VAR, and two-step VAR
presented by Breitung (2005)
20
panel DOLS exhibits the same form of second order asymptotic bias as pooled
OLS (Mark & Sul 2003).
To correct for this, Mark et al. (2005) have developed a panel dynamic seem-
ingly unrelated regression estimator that controls for the possible endogeneity be-
tween equilibrium errors and cross-equations and that is efficient when errors are
correlated across cross-sectional units. Panel DSUR estimator can be used when
the cross-section is small relative to time series.
The data generation process in Mark et al. (2005) DSUR estimator is of the
form
yit = βix′it + uit, (11)
4xit = eit (12)
where there are n cointegrating regression each with T observations, and xit and
eit are k × 1 dimensional vectors. Endogeneity is controlled for by including leads
and lags of (12) into the regression, as in panel DOLS estimator presented above.
Panel DSUR estimates a long-run covariance matrix that is used in estimation of
equation (11). This makes panel DSUR more efficient than panel DOLS when
cross-sections are dependent. The efficiency of panel DSUR actually improves as
the correlation between cross-sections increases.
4.2.2 Estimation results
The estimated model now includes a measure of physical capital accumulation
(investments) and a measure of income inequality (Gini index).21 Panel DOLS
estimation is used to estimate the following equation:
log(GDPit) = αi + γ′1log(investmentsit) + γ
′
2log(Giniit) + λit + θt + uit, (13)
21The data on average schooling cannot be included in estimation, because Barro & Lee’s (2000)
dataset uses intervals of five years.
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where αi are individual constant, λit are individual trends, θt is common time
effect, (1,−γ′1,−γ′2) is a cointegrating vector between GDP, investments and Gini
index, and uit is a idiosyncratic error. Table 5 presents the results of fixed effects
DOLS estimation of equation (13).22
Table 5: DOLS estimates of the cointegrating coefficient of Gini index
Dependent variable: log(GDP)
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=1)
log(investments) 0.2199**** 0.0954*
(0.0402) (0.0455)
log(Gini index) -0.1836**** -0.0678**
(0.0252) (0.0217)
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=2)
log(investments) 0.1851**** 0.1852***
(0.0447) (0.0433)
log(Gini index) -0.2427**** -0.0632
(0.0287) (0.0290)
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=3)
log(investments) 0.1281*** 0.3847****
(0.0488) (0.0384)
log(Gini index) -0.3069**** -0.0375
(0.0297) (0.0194)
countries 15 38
years 37 25
observations 816 950
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001, **** = p<.0001. Standard errors of the parameter estimates
are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are estimated using Andrews and Monahan’s Pre-
whitening method. Inclusion of individual constants means that all estimations are made with
fixed effects. Leads & lags=1 means that first lags and leads of first differences of explanatory
variables are used as instruments. Leads & lags=2 means that first and second leads and lags of
first differences are used as instruments, etc.
The cointegrating coefficient of investments is positive and statistically signif-
icant in all estimation. The cointegrating coefficient of Gini index is negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level in all estimations using the dataset with 37
22Estimation was conducted with Gauss. The program code was provided by Mark and Sul
(2003).
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yearly observations. In estimations using the dataset with 25 yearly observations,
the cointegrating coefficient of the Gini index is not statistically significant at the
5% level when two and three leads and lags of the first differences are used as
instruments for the explanatory variables.
Thus, the results of panel DOLS estimation using the 15 country dataset with
longer time dimension imply that the long-run growth elasticity with respect to
income inequality would be negative. However, the results of panel DOLS esti-
mation using the 38 country dataset with shorter time dimension are inconclusive.
4.3 Estimation of group-related elasticities of growth
Recently, Hineline (2007) has found that the estimated coefficient of explanatory
variables generally used in growth regressions differ substantially between OECD
and non-OECD countries. Pedroni’s (2004) panel cointegration test also allowed
for individual cointegrating coefficients between statistical units. It is therefore
possible that the cointegrating coefficient of Gini index may differ in different
groups of countries. To test for the homogeneity of cointegrating coefficient of
Gini index, countries are divided into OECD member and non-OECD countries
according to their year of initiation. In other words, group "OECD" includes those
countries that became members of the OECD before or in 1972.
The results obtained using the OECD and non-OECD country data sets are
contradictory and inconclusive. For example, the estimate of the cointegrating
coefficient of Gini index differs across groups and estimators.23 This implies
that there are such differences in the relation between inequality and growth even
within the OECD countries that it is more informative to group the countries ac-
cording to some other variable.
23The detailed results are available upon request.
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One obvious grouping variable is the level of economic development, espe-
cially as many of the theories presented in section 2 predict that the effect of
inequality on growth may differ in different stages of economic development. To
estimate the long-run growth elasticities of income inequality and physical capital
accumulation in different income groups countries in the dataset are divided into
three income groups. To make the estimation of income groups asymptotically
feasible, i.e. to make the groups large enough, countries are divided into three
equally sized groups. This is done using all the countries in the 53 country dataset
that have observations on the GDP in 1972. There are 48 such countries in the
dataset of 53 countries and so we have 3 groups of 16 countries. The thresholds
for these groups become: GDP per capita of $1270 in 1972 for less developed
countries, GDP per capita between $1271 and $3715 in 1972 for middle-income
countries, and GDP per capita above $3716 in 1972 for rich countries. Table 10
presents the results of panel DOLS estimation of equation (13) in different income
groups of countries.24
The cointegrating coefficient of investments is positive and statistically sig-
nificant in less developed economies, but not statistically significant in middle-
income and rich economies when two or three leads and lags are used as instru-
ments. The cointegrating coefficient of Gini index is negative and statistically
significant at the 5% level in middle-income and rich economies. In less devel-
oped economies, the cointegrating coefficient of Gini index is positive and statis-
tically significant at the 5% level when two and three leads and lags are used as
instruments.
The results of table 6 have two implications. The elasticity of growth with
respect to investments, i.e. physical capital accumulation, diminishes in accor-
24Estimation was conducted with Gauss. The program code was provided by Mark and Sul
(2003).
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Table 6: DOLS estimates of the cointegrating coefficients of Gini index in differ-
ent income groups
Dependent variable: log(GDP)
less-developed middle-income rich
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=1)
log(investments) 0.1766**** 0.1000* -0.0018
(0.0366) (0.0496) (0.0974)
log(Gini index) -0.0069 -0.1317* -0.1443*
(0.0190) (0.0559) (0.0627)
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=2)
log(investments) 0.2678**** 0.0803 0.0919
(0.0583) (0.0543) (0.0742)
log(Gini index) 0.0549* -0.1520**** -0.2417****
(0.0238) (0.0299) (0.0490)
Panel DOLS (leads & lags=3)
log(investments) 0.4492**** 0.2667**** 0.1962**
(0.0366) (0.0397) (0.0596)
log(Gini index) 0.1014**** -0.2175**** -0.4558****
(0.0152) (0.0397) (0.0424)
countries 11 12 15
years 25 25 25
observations 275 300 375
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001, **** = p<.0001. Standard errors are presented in paren-
theses. Standard errors are estimated using Andrews and Monahan’s Pre-whitening method. All
estimations include individual constants, individual trends, and common time effects.
dance with the level of economic development and the elasticity of growth with
respect to income inequality changes in the process of economic development. In
early stages of economic development, the effect of income inequality on growth
is positive, but turns negative as the economy becomes more developed. The neg-
ative growth elasticity of inequality also increases in accordance with the level of
economic development.
However, as mentioned above, panel DOLS may be asymptotically biased if
there remains correlation between equilibrium error, uit, and leads and lags of
other cross-sections 4x jt, j , i. To account for the possible cross-equation corre-
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lation, the panel DSUR estimator is applied to income group estimation. Because
panel DSUR requires that the time series dimension is clearly larger than cross-
sectional dimension, a dataset that has 34 yearly observations on 24 countries is
used. Grouping of countries is done in the same way as presented above. There
are 44 countries in the dataset of 53 countries that have observations on real GDP
per capita in 1963. Thus, 33% of all countries would give 14.6 countries per
group. Because of this, 14 countries are included in the groups of less devel-
oped and rich countries and 16 countries to the group of middle-income countries.
The thresholds for these groups become: GDP per capita under $637 in 1963
for less developed economies, GDP per capita between $638 and $1903 in 1963
for middle-income economies, and GDP per capita over $1904 in 1963 for rich
economies. Table 7 gives the results of panel dynamic SUR estimation of equation
(13) in different income groups.25
According to the results presented in table 7, the cointegrating coefficient of
investments is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in less developed
and middle-income countries.26 The cointegrating coefficient of investments is not
statistically significant at the 5% level in any of the estimations of rich countries.
The elasticity of growth with respect to investments also gets smaller as countries
get richer. This implies that the influence of investments on per capita growth
diminishes as the level of physical capital increases. However, it is unexpected
that the cointegrating coefficient of investments is not positive and statistically
significant in rich economies. The cointegrating coefficient of the Gini index is
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in all income groups.27
25Estimation was conducted with Gauss. The program code was provided by Mark et al. (2005).
26Estimations were also done with three leads and lags, but as there were no major changes in
the results, only results of estimations with one and two leads and lags are presented here.
27Equation (13) was also estimated using only the data on 6 of the most developed countries.
Results were similar to those presented in table 7.
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As such, results presented in table 7 contradict the results of panel DOLS
estimation, where the cointegrating coefficient of the Gini index was positive and
statistically significant in less developed economies when two and three leads and
lags were used as instruments. This could result from cross-sectional correlation
not captured by the common time effect, from correlation between equilibrium
error and cross-equations, or from efficiency of panel DSUR compared to panel
DOLS. To test this, four countries that were not present in the dataset of seven
less-developed countries used in panel DSUR estimation are removed from the
dataset of 11 countries used in panel DOLS estimation. The remaining seven
country dataset is then estimated with panel DSUR and DOLS. The cointegrating
coefficient of the Gini index is positive and not statistically significant in panel
DOLS estimation, but turns to negative and statistically significant when panel
Table 7: DSUR estimates of the cointegrating coefficients of Gini index in differ-
ent income groups
Dependent variable: log(GDP)
less developed middle-income rich
Panel DSUR (leads & lags=1)
log(investments) 0.1532**** 0.1296*** 0.0068
(0.0309) (0.0345) (0.0114)
log(Gini index) -0.1567**** -0.1700**** -0.1187****
(0.0208) (0.0282) (0.0069)
Panel DSUR (leads & lags=2)
log(investments) 0.1841**** 0.0843**** -0.0151
(0.0132) (0.0168) (0.0092)
log(Gini index) -0.1337**** -0.1622**** -0.1216****
(0.0132) (0.0168) (0.0071)
countries 7 6 11
years 34 34 34
observations 238 204 374
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001, **** = p<.0001. Standard errors are presented in parenthe-
ses. Standard errors are estimated using parametric correction. All estimations include individual
constants, individual trends, and common time effects.
27
DSUR is used. So, it seems that the positive long-run growth elasticity of income
inequality presented in table 6 probably resulted from bias in the DOLS estimator.
5 Conclusions
The results show that the distribution of income and economic development seem
to have a steady-state equilibrium relation, or relations, as commonly predicted
by theoretical models. The results also show that this long-run growth elasticity
of income inequality is negative in all income groups. Results imply that there are
no major differences in the effect of income inequality on growth at the different
stages of economic development. This may result from globalization, i.e. from
the removal of barriers of trade and capital flows. Modern developing economies
do not need to accumulate capital through greater aggregate savings. Capital and
skill-biased technologies are instead imported, and developing countries can con-
centrate on maximizing the accumulation of human capital through more equal
income distribution.
There are three reservations that have to be attached to the results: the highly
simplified production function, the time dimension, and the extent of the data
used in estimation. The production function used in estimation included only two
inputs, namely physical capital and income inequality. It was assumed that the
coefficient of inequality reflects the effect of human capital on production growth.
However, it is likely that the observed effect of income inequality reflects the
economic effects of several other variables as well. It has been shown that income
inequality may, in addition to human capital, have an effect on several variables,
e.g. social capital, aggregate savings, and social stability. Controlling for all these
variables could result in biased coefficient of inequality, because the coefficient
would not represent the aggregate effect of income inequality but only a partial
28
effect. Thus, it may be feasible not to try to control the different channels through
which income inequality may affect growth.
Panel cointegration methods have made it possible to test for cointegration us-
ing only a handful of time series obsevations. This has brought about a dilemma.
If only a few dozen time series observations are needed for cointegration testing,
what is the time dimension after which the relationship can be described as a long-
run relation? It was assumed here that a "lower bound" for long-run relationship
is one generation (25 to 30 yearly observations). Some may argue that, economi-
cally, this does not constitute long-run. However, theories describing the effect of
inequality on growth predict that there may be temporary steady-state equilibria
between them at different stages of economic development. As results presented
here indicate that countries in question seem to be, at least, in their temporary
steady-state equilibria within this period, it seems that one generation could be
considered long-run in this setting.
The dataset used in estimation was fairly small including only 38 countries at
maximum. There were also only few less developed countries included in group-
related estimations. Due to this, the results of less developed economies should be
taken cautiously, but the data on rich countries was far more comprehensive. In
rich economies, estimation results validated the general finding of the theories de-
scribing the relationship between income inequality and growth. That is, income
inequality is associated with lower long-run economic growth in rich economies.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Bourguignon’s (1981) version of Stiglitz’s (1969) model of in-
come distribution and wealth
In the model, labor is assumed to be homogenous, and the members of each
group have the same income and wealth. Wealth stays within a group between
generations and inheritance are equally divided among heirs. Groups differ in
their wealth. Each factor is paid by marginal product and production function is
assumed to have constant returns to scale and it is assumed to satisfy the Inada
conditions. Capital is privately owned. Output per capita, y, is defined by
y = f (k), f ′(k) > 0, f ′′ < 0, (14)
where k is the aggregate capital-labour ratio.
r = f ′(k),w = f (k) − k f ′(k), (15)
where w is the wage rate and r is the interest rate. When ci is the consumption per
capita,
yi = w + rci. (16)
The groups, m, grow at he same rate, n and they therefore have a constant weight
in the population, ai. Thus, when capital is privatively owned:
k = Σmi=1aici. (17)
All individuals have the same monotonically increasing savings function, S (y),
which is assumed to be convex. Additionally it is assumed that
0 < S ′(y) < 1, S ′′(y) > 0, S ′(y)→ 1,when y→ ∞ (18)
36
Combining 14 and 17 we get a differential system{
c˙i = S [ f (k) + (ci − k) f ′(k)] − nc
k = Σiaici,
(19)
which defines the dynamic behavior of the economy. When production technology
A(k) is defined as
A(k)c′(k) + [1 − A(k)]c′′(k) = k, (20)
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an unegalitarian equilibrium
is:
k0 < k∗, in f (a1, a2)  A¯, (21)
where k0 is the capital in egalitarian equilibrium. The concavity of f () implies
that
f (k) + (c − k) f ′(k) > f (c) f or any (k, c), (22)
where the left hand side is the income of individuals having the wealth of c when
the average wealt of population is k. In any of the unegalitarian equilibriums (c′
or c′′) it is also the case that
k0 < c′(k) < c′′(k). (23)
According to (22) and (23) unegalitarian equilibrium is Pareto superior to egali-
tarian equilibrium.
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Appendix B: Country lists
Table 8: Country list I
Country observations country observations
Australia 35 Malaysia 32
Austria 37 Malta 27
Bangladesh 21 Mauritius 32
Barbados 28 Mexico 30
Belgium 30 Netherlands 37
Bolivia 30 New Zealand 34
Canada 37 Nicaragua 21
Chile 37 Norway 36
Colombia 37 Panama 32
Cyprus 37 Papua New Guinea 20
Denmark 36 Philippines 35
Ecuador 37 Portugal 27
Egypt 36 Senegal 24
El Salvador 28 Singapore 37
Fiji 23 Spain 37
Finland 36 Sweden 37
Germany 25 Syrian Arab Republic 36
Greece 37 Taiwan 25
Hong Kong 27 Turkey 36
Hungary 30 UK 32
India 37 USA 37
Indonesia 29 Uruguay 23
Ireland 36 Venezuela 29
Israel 34
Italy 32
Japan 37
Korea, Republic of 37
Kuwait 38
Macao 20
Madagascar 22
N=53
Observations give the maximum number of simultaneous observations
in the series of EHII2.1 Gini index and real GDP per capita.
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Table 9: Country list II
Countries (25 years) Countries (34 years) Countries (37 years)
Australia Australia Austria
Austria Austria Canada
Barbados Canada Chile
Bolivia Chile Colombia
Canada Colombia Ecuador
Chile Denmark Finland
Colombia Ecuador Greece
Cyprus Finland India
Denmark Greece Japan
Ecuador India Korea, Republic of
Egypt Ireland Netherlands
Finland Israel Singapore
Greece Japan Spain
Hungary Korea, Republic of Sweden
India Netherland United States
Indonesia New Zealand
Ireland Norway
Israel Philippines
Italy Singapore
Japan Spain
Korea, Republic of Sweden
Kuwait Syria
Malaysia Turkey
Malta United States
Mauritius
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Philippines
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
Syria
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Venezuela
N=38 N=24 N=15
Years give the number of simultaneous yearly observations in the series of EHII2.1 Gini index and
real GDP per capita.
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